Key findings
- $356 billionestimated gross-to-net bubble across U.S. brand drugs in 2024, a 7% increase and the slowest growth in at least a decade
- 40–60%of the published WAC is the realized ASP the manufacturer typically collects after rebates and statutory discounts
- 38–79%below list: the prices produced by the first round of Medicare negotiation under the Inflation Reduction Act
- 29.9% vs 10.5%fall in new-product launches across the nineteen-country reference basket versus the U.S., in matched windows around the May 2025 MFN order
Abstract
- Background
- The United States biopharmaceutical branded drug list prices, known as Wholesale Acquisition Costs, anchor every downstream reimbursement formula. However, they match the transaction price for no payer. The gap reached an estimated $356 billion for brand drugs in 2024. This review asks how manufacturers build the list price, why it overstates the realized price, and how the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act and 2025 Most-Favored-Nation order alter that logic.
- Methods
- Because realized net prices and rebate splits reside in confidential contracts and cannot be pooled, this gray-literature review used a structured narrative synthesis. This effort involved screening sources through a Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses-informed process and tiered by reliability. The analysis traced the list price across construction, divergence, and policy compression.
- Results
- Manufacturers construct the list price through five frameworks- analog benchmarking, value modeling, willingness-to-pay research, cost-recovery modeling, and rebate-room engineering- that function as a rationalization stack producing the maximum defensible price. This gap is structurally inevitable: five forces drive the price manufacturers collect to 40–60% of list, or below. Patients pay cost-sharing on the inflated list price while intermediaries capture the rebate. First-round Medicare negotiations cut prices 38–79% below list, and the Most-Favored-Nation order anchors U.S. prices to the lowest price paid among comparable nations.
- Conclusions
- The gap between list and net price is not a market inefficiency; it is a system operating as designed, with the list price an instrument for rebate generation. The Inflation Reduction Act and Most-Favored-Nation order compress the headroom that logic depends onon which that logic depends. Patients benefit only if policymakers redesign cost-sharing around net price. The review offers a causal account and an auditable evidence method for this proprietary domain.
Introduction
The price a United States (U.S.) pharmaceutical manufacturer publishes for a new brand drug, known as its Wholesale Acquisition Cost, or WAC, misleads almost everyone who reads it. WAC represents a surgically constructed representation of the list price published for the market. This published price then functions not as a transaction price but rather as an accounting anchor. Although WAC bears little relationship to realized transaction prices, it persists because it serves as the contractual benchmark for wholesalers, pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), pharmacies, government programs, and commercial insurers. Replacing WAC would, therefore, require redesigning much of the existing pharmaceutical payment infrastructure rather than simply changing manufacturer pricing decisions. This construct reflects the base against which rebates, statutory discounts, and patient cost-sharing are all calculated. Essentially, no payer pays it.
This gap between what manufacturers charge and what they collect has a name and a number. The Drug Channels Institute calls the cumulative distance the "gross-to-net bubble" and estimates it reached $356 billion across brand drugs in 2024, a 7% increase that nonetheless marked the slowest growth in at least a decade.1 For many therapeutic classes, manufacturers capture only 30–60% of WAC after rebates and deductions.1 The bubble is not an accident of an inefficient market. Instead, this paper argues it is the predictable output of a pricing system that uses the list price as an instrument for generating rebate revenue rather than as a signal of cost or worth.
Patients absorb the harm this design creates. Pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) and plan sponsors capture rebate value.2 However, insurers calculate patient coinsurance and deductibles against the inflated WAC rather than the lower net price. A patient, therefore, pays cost-sharing on a number that the manufacturer, the PBM, and the plan all know will never change hands at full value. The result perversely concentrates cost on the sickest and least-insured patients while the intermediaries collect the discount.
Emerging from this pricing fallacy are two policy forces that now threaten the architecture underlying this gross-to-net dynamic. The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022 lets Medicare negotiate a Maximum Fair Price (MFP) for high-spend drugs and imposes new manufacturer discounts in Part D.3 The first round of negotiation produced prices 38–79% below the list.4 The Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) executive order, signed on May 12, 2025, ties U.S. prices to the lowest price paid by comparable wealthy nations.5 Both compress the headroom on which the rebate economy depends. If they hold, the list price loses its function as a rebate-generating instrument, and the bubble, already growing at its slowest rate in a decade, begins to deflate. Whether patients capture that deflation, however, depends on choices the policies do not by themselves resolve. The currently available literature spans methodology studies that explain how prices are constructed, political-economy research that examines rebate extraction, and recent policy analyses that largely treat the IRA and MFN as separate interventions.2,6 These literatures rarely ever meet. This paper bridges those perspectives by tracing the Wholesale Acquisition Cost (WAC) from its construction, through the rebate-driven waterfall that separates it from Average Sales Price (ASP), to the policy changes now reshaping pharmaceutical pricing.2,6
This paper's central aim is to show that the list price functions as an engineered instrument for rebate generation rather than a market signal, and to trace how the IRA and MFN compress the economic logic on which that instrument depends. It pursues this aim through three linked questions. First (research question 1, RQ1), how do manufacturers construct an initial WAC, and which analytical inputs feed that decision? Second (research question 2, RQ2), why does WAC systematically overstate the realized Average Sales Price (ASP)? That is, what makes "gross-to-net" a structural fallacy rather than an ordinary discount? Third (research question 3, RQ3), how do the IRA and MFN alter the underlying logic of list-price construction? This analysis covers U.S. branded outpatient and physician-administered drugs from 2010 through 2026.
In answering these questions, the paper makes three contributions. First, it offers a theoretical integration: where prior work treats list-price methodology, the PBM rebate economy, and the 2022–2026 policy disruption as separate subjects. This review connects them in a single causal account that follows one artifact, the WAC, from construction, through the waterfall that separates it from ASP, into the policy environment now compressing it. Second, it contributes a methodological template: a tiered, verifiability-governed gray-literature synthesis for a domain whose decisive data. This template involves confidential, non-pooled realized net prices and rebate splits, demonstrating how the analysis combines government, peer-reviewed, and trade sources rigorously rather than impressionistically. Third, it provides a practical mapping that ties each research question to its specific evidentiary basis, anchoring findings and location in the paper (Tables 5–7), giving readers an auditable account of which evidence supports which claim and how confident each conclusion can be. Together, these contributions convert a diffuse, partly proprietary literature into a structured argument that clinicians, payers, and policymakers can interrogate.
This paper charts the following flow. It begins with a review of relevant literature to position the research gaps and questions for the gray literature review. Next, it defines the study's methodology, including design, source selection, review, and analysis. This section presents the outputs of the analysis, as described in the results' descriptive and thematic sections. The paper then puts these observations into perspective in the discussion, covering interpretation, implications for stakeholders, contributions, limitations, and future research. Such a discussion helps tie together critical take-home points in the conclusion.
Literature Review
This review necessarily draws on gray literature. The authoritative data on rebates and net prices are contained in confidential manufacturer–PBM contracts, so no public, peer-reviewed dataset captures the realized price of most brand drugs. The analysis, therefore, weighs government staff reports, trade institute estimates, and consultancy analyses alongside peer-reviewed methodological sources, and flags the provenance and verifiability of each claim. Four bodies of work frame the problem.
The benchmark-price literature
A foundational descriptive literature establishes that the U.S. drug-pricing system runs on multiple reference prices, summarized in Table 1, none of which equals the transaction price. This benchmark hierarchy matters because it shows that the entire reimbursement system rests on a list price that never transacts.
Table 1. Key U.S. Drug Pricing Benchmarks
| Benchmark | Definition | Role in the System |
|---|---|---|
| WAC | Manufacturer's published list price to wholesalers. | Anchors virtually every downstream formula; no purchaser of consequence pays it. |
| AWP | Calculated by convention as WAC × 1.20. | Drives pharmacy reimbursement formulas and patient cost-sharing despite reflecting no actual transaction. |
| ASP | Volume-weighted net average price, reported quarterly with a two-quarter lag. | Closest public proxy to the true market price; unavailable for new launches. |
| AMP | Net average price to wholesalers and retailers. | Underlies Medicaid rebate and 340B ceiling calculations; remains confidential. |
Notes: AMP = Average Manufacturer Price; ASP = Average Sales Price; AWP = Average Wholesale Price; WAC = Wholesale Acquisition Cost
The pricing-research methodology literature
A mature peer-reviewed literature documents the techniques manufacturers use to set launch prices, summarized in Table 2. Across willingness-to-pay research, value-based modeling, and discounted-cash-flow cost-recovery frameworks, one structural bias recurs: because U.S. respondents and models evaluate WAC rather than the net price that will actually transact, a nontransacting list price anchors every downstream estimate.
Table 2. Pricing-Research Methods Manufacturers Use to Justify Launch Prices
| Method or Framework | What It Measures | Key Source(s) | Structural Limitation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conjoint analysis; discrete choice experiments | WTP based on a series of choice set of attributes. | Ryan & Farrar;7 BHBIA8 | Respondents evaluate WAC, not the net price that will actually transact |
| Van Westendorp Price Sensitivity Meter | Directional price-acceptability range | Van Westendorp9 | Same anchoring bias: measures tolerance for a list price, not a market-clearing price |
| Gabor-Granger method | Price-demand relationship via direct questioning | Gabor & Granger10 | Same anchoring bias |
| Value/QALY modeling | Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio against a $100,000–$150,000-per-QALY threshold | Institute for Clinical and Economic Review (ICER);11 Neumann et al.12 | Manufacturers populate models with favorable assumptions; launch prices often exceed the threshold (Bloudek et al.13) |
| Cost-effectiveness/cost-utility/cost-benefit frameworks | Standard health-economic evaluation methods | Drummond et al.14 | Provides methodology, not a check on whether WAC reflects realized value |
| Discounted cash flow (DCF) recovery | Backward-calculated price needed to recover capitalized R&D cost | DiMasi et al.15 | No statistical association exists between a drug's development cost and its market price. |
DCF = discounted cash flow; ICER = Institute for Clinical and Economic Review; QALY = quality-adjusted life year; WAC = Wholesale Acquisition Cost; WTP = willingness-to-pay.
The PBM and rebate political-economy literature
The newest and most consequential strand documents how intermediaries convert list-price headroom into revenue. The Federal Trade Commission's (FTC)2 Interim Staff Report, built on compulsory Section 6(b) data orders to six major PBMs, found that the largest PBMs manage roughly 95% of U.S. prescriptions and, in some cases, steer formularies toward higher-cost drugs when doing so increases PBM-affiliated revenue. PBMs originally emerged to administer pharmacy benefits and process prescription claims efficiently. Over several decades, however, industry consolidation and the growing importance of manufacturer rebates transformed PBMs from administrative service organizations into central financial intermediaries whose economic incentives became increasingly tied to rebate flows. Chopra's16 statement on "rebate walls" explains how rebate arrangements can foreclose lower-list-price competitors from formulary access regardless of clinical merit. The Drug Channels Institute provides annual gross-to-net estimates and frames the emerging market as a "Net Pricing Drug Channel," in which net prices, not list prices, increasingly govern access and strategy.1,17 Reports on the broader value chain extend this picture, documenting that distribution and PBM functions are each extreme oligopolies, with the three largest PBMs processing roughly 80% of prescription claims for some 270 million people.6
The gap this paper addresses
These literatures rarely meet. Methodology papers describe pricing techniques without connecting them to rebate extraction. Political-economy reports document PBM behavior without tracing it back to the construction of launch prices. The 2025–26 policy analyses treat the IRA and MFN largely as standalone interventions. Few sources connect the construction methodology, the rebate economy, and the policy rupture within a single causal frame. This paper fills that gap by following one artifact, the WAC, from its construction, through the waterfall that separates it from ASP, into the policy environment now compressing it.
Methods
Design: a gray-literature review
This study is, by necessity and by design, a gray-literature review. It employs structured narrative synthesis rather than a meta-analysis or a systematic review with pooled effect sizes, and that choice follows directly from the nature of the evidence. The decisive facts in U.S. drug pricing (e.g., realized net prices, the size and direction of rebates, and the split of rebate value between PBMs and plan sponsors) are not published. They reside in confidential commercial contracts and in proprietary datasets sold by trade institutes. No public, peer-reviewed dataset captures the realized transaction price of most brand drugs, so the statistical pooling that a meta-analysis requires is impossible. The most authoritative quantitative estimates available (e.g., the gross-to-net bubble figure, the rebate-retention share, the WAC-to-ASP ratio) originate in gray literature. These include government staff reports issued under compulsory process, trade institute analyses, and consultancy studies. A gray-literature review is therefore not a second-best substitute for a conventional systematic review in this domain; it is the only design that can engage the evidence that governs the system. Treating these gray sources rigorously, screening them transparently, tiering them, flagging their provenance, and triangulating them is the methodological core of this study.
The study followed a Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA)-informed identification-and-screening process, which the authors have adapted for gray literature (Figure 1). The effort involved drawing records from two parallel streams: peer-reviewed and database records (PubMed, Google Scholar, and journal websites) and gray literature sources (government and agency reports, trade institute and consultancy analyses, and legal or policy documents). The next step engaged in the removal of duplicates and ineligible records, the screening of titles and abstracts (or executive summaries), and assessment of the remaining full texts for eligibility. The final synthesis retained 31 sources distributed across the three reliability tiers. Exclusions at the eligibility stage applied a single dominant criterion, verifiability, alongside recency and redundancy, as detailed below.
Source tiering and the verifiability rule
Because gray literature varies enormously in reliability, the study classified every retained source into one of three tiers and weighted its claims accordingly (Table 3). Tier 1 comprises primary U.S. government and legal sources, including the FTC, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the official presidential document and Federal Register record, and the underlying statutes. Tier 2 comprises peer-reviewed methodology and health policy journals that carry a Digital Object Identifier (DOI) or PubMed Identifier (PMID). Tier 3 comprises trade institutes and consultancies whose estimates are authoritative within the industry but are not independently audited.
Table 3. Source Reliability Tiers Used in the Gray-Literature Synthesis
| Tier | Source type | Examples | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tier 1 | Primary U.S. government and legal records | FTC interim staff report; CMS/ASPE; HHS; Executive Order 14297; statutes | Highest |
| Tier 2 | Peer-reviewed methodology and policy journals (DOI/PMID) | Ryan & Farrar7; Neumann et al.12; Bloudek et al.13 | High |
| Tier 3 | Trade institutes and consultancies (unaudited) | Drug Channels Institute; ICER; BHBIA | Moderate; triangulated |
Note. Every cited claim must trace to a DOI, PMID, or official URL. Tier 3 quantitative estimates are reported as the best available figures and triangulated with Tier 1 documentation wherever possible.
ASPE = Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation; BHBIA = British Healthcare Business Intelligence Association; CMS = Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services; DOI = Digital object identifier; FTC = Federal Trade Commission; HHS = U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; ICER = Institute for Clinical and Economic Review; PMID = PubMed identifier.
This study applied a verifiability rule to every cited claim: each must trace to a DOI, a PMID, or an official URL, and the analysis labels each estimate by tier and notes where the underlying data are unaudited or proprietary. Where a quantitative figure originates in a Tier 3 source (e.g., the $356 billion gross-to-net estimate1), the study reports it as a best-available estimate rather than an audited fact and triangulates it against Tier 1 documentation wherever possible. The 38–79% first-round Medicare negotiation discount, by contrast, CMS and Assistant Secretary of Planning and Evaluation (ASPE) document directly,4 and the 95%-of-prescriptions PBM concentration figure derives from a Tier 1 FTC2 report built on compulsory data orders; the analysis treats both with correspondingly greater confidence.
Inclusion window
The study applied two inclusion windows matched to the stability of the underlying knowledge. For pricing research methodology, conjoint analysis, the Price Sensitivity Meter, quality-adjusted life year (QALY) thresholds, and cost-effectiveness frameworks, the window runs from 2000 to 2026 because these foundations change slowly and the seminal papers predate the policy era. For market and policy data (gross-to-net estimates, PBM behavior, IRA implementation, and the MFN regime), the window narrows to 2021–2026 to capture the rapidly evolving present state. The study excludes generic and biosimilar pricing except where it serves as a cost-plus contrast case, because the gross-to-net dynamic the paper examines is specific to single-source brand drugs.
Analytical framework
The analysis traced the WAC through three sequential stages, and this sequence organizes the Results. In the construction stage, the study decomposed the launch-pricing decision into the parallel analytical frameworks that manufacturers run (e.g., analog benchmarking, value/QALY modeling, willingness-to-pay research, discounted cash flow (DCF) recovery modeling, and strategic rebate-room engineering) and evaluates whether these function as independent constraints or as a single rationalization. In the divergence stage, the study followed the price waterfall from WAC through commercial rebates, Medicaid statutory rebates, 340B ceiling pricing, and the new IRA Part D manufacturer discount down to realized ASP and, separately, to patient out-of-pocket cost (Table 4). It then isolated the structural forces that launch models cannot anticipate. In the compression stage, the study assessed how the IRA and MFN alter each link in that chain. Throughout, this analysis distinguishes descriptive findings (what the system is and how large its components are) from its thematic findings (why the system behaves as it does) and reports these Results separately.
Table 4. The Wholesale Acquisition Cost-to-Net Price Waterfall for a Single Brand-Drug Unit
| Stage in the Waterfall | Impact on WAC | Mechanism |
|---|---|---|
| WAC (starting anchor) | 100% | Published list price: the fictional starting point |
| Commercial PBM rebates | −30% to −60% | Negotiated for preferred formulary tier; up to −70% in high-competition classes. |
| Medicaid statutory rebates | −23.1%+ of AMP | Statutory floor; uncapped since 2021, so liability can exceed AMP |
| 340B ceiling price | −25% to −50% | AMP minus Medicaid unit rebate; purchases hit $81B in 2024 (+23%) |
| IRA Part D manufacturer discount | New drug (2025+) | Mandatory discount in the catastrophic phase; absent from pre-IRA models |
| Realized ASP | 40–60% of WAC | What the manufacturer actually collects per unit, averaged across channels |
| Patient out-of-pocket | NA | Cost-sharing is computed on the inflated anchor, not on the net price |
Note. Figures are the best available estimates synthesized from Tier 1 and Tier 3 sources .1,2,4,18
AMP = Average Manufacturer Price; ASP = Average Sales Price; IRA = Inflation Reduction Act; NA = Not applicable; PBM = Pharmacy benefit manager; WAC = Wholesale Acquisition Cost.
Results I: Descriptive Findings
This section describes the pricing system and the size of its components; the thematic findings that explain why it behaves as it does.
The benchmark architecture
The four reference prices defined in Table 1 govern the system, and they diverge by design. No purchaser of consequence pays WAC, yet it anchors every downstream formula, including the formula that determines what patients owe.
The scale of the gap
The gross-to-net bubble has grown steadily and remains enormous (Figure 2). Gross-to-net reductions for brand drugs reached approximately $334 billion in 2023, rose to $356 billion in 2024 (a 7% increase, the slowest growth in at least a decade), and will be $416 billion for 2025.1 In the latter year, the average brand list prices grew only 3.5% while average net prices declined, an early signal of the deflation that the thematic findings examine.17 Across competitive therapeutic classes, ASP lands at 40–60% of WAC, and in the most heavily rebated classes, it falls to 30–40% of WAC.
The price waterfall
A single unit's journey from WAC to net revenue passes through stacked deductions, summarized in Table 4. Commercial rebates remove 30–60% of WAC; Medicaid statutory rebates and 340B ceiling pricing remove more; and the new IRA Part D manufacturer discount adds a further drag. The realized ASP that the manufacturer collects typically lands at 40–60% of the published WAC. Patient out-of-pocket cost-sharing, however, is computed on the full WAC rather than on this net figure, which is the structural injustice that the thematic findings develop.
Market concentration
Concentration compounds the dynamic at every downstream node. Six PBMs manage roughly 95% of U.S. prescriptions, and the three largest (CVS Caremark, Express Scripts, and Optum Rx) process about 80% of claims for some 270 million people.2,6 This concentration gives intermediaries leverage to demand larger rebates, shape formulary access, and reinforce the list-to-net divergence examined in Section 5.
Results II — Thematic Findings
The descriptive findings presented in Sections 4.1–4.4 established the architecture, magnitude, and market structure of the U.S. pharmaceutical pricing system. The thematic findings that follow address the study's three research questions and explain why the system behaves as it does. Theme 1 examines how manufacturers construct WAC, Theme 2 explains why WAC systematically diverges from realized ASP, and Theme 3 evaluates how the IRA and MFN disrupt the economic logic that sustained the gross-to-net architecture. Tables 5 through 7 map the evidence supporting each theme and research question.
Theme one: the Wholesale Acquisition Cost is constructed, not calculated (RQ1)
This theme addresses the first research question: how manufacturers build the WAC and which analytical inputs feed that decision. Table 5 maps the sources behind each of the five frameworks to the specific in-text evidence they supply, demonstrating that the answer rests predominantly on peer-reviewed pricing-methodology literature supplemented by government documentation describing rebate-driven pricing incentives.
Table 5. Literature Mapping for RQ1 — How do manufacturers construct an initial WAC, and which analytical inputs feed that decision?
| Source (Relevance to the Review) | Evidence Addressing the Question | Specific In-Text Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Ryan & Farrar;7 BHBIA;8 Van Westendorp;9 Gabor & Granger:10 Pricing-research methods | Establish the willingness-to-pay and price-sensitivity techniques manufacturers use to scope a launch price. | Conjoint analysis, the Price Sensitivity Meter, and Gabor-Granger testing measure tolerance for a list price that no payer expects to pay. |
| ICER;11 Neumann et al.;12 Bloudek et al.:13 Value/QALY benchmarking | Document the $100K–$150K/QALY benchmark and its routine breach, showing value modeling rationalizes rather than constrains price | 71% of 102 drugs exceeded the $150K/QALY threshold; median 36% net price reduction required to reach it |
| DiMasi et al.:15 R&D cost recovery | Supplies the capitalized-cost figure invoked in DCF recovery models, while conceding that cost does not determine price | ~$2.558B capitalized cost per approval; no statistical link between a drug's development cost and its market price |
| FTC:2 Strategic rebate-room engineering | Shows manufacturers set WAC above the value-justified price to create rebate headroom required for formulary access | Largest PBMs manage ~95% of prescriptions; formularies steered toward higher-cost drugs when it raised PBM-affiliated revenue. |
Note. RQ1 evidence is predominantly Tier 2 (peer-reviewed methodology), supplemented by the Tier 1 FTC report on the rebate-room mechanism.
BHBIA = British Healthcare Business Intelligence Association; DCF = discounted cash flow; FTC = Federal Trade Commission; ICER = Institute for Clinical and Economic Review; PBM = pharmacy benefit manager; QALY = quality-adjusted life year; R&D = research and development; WAC = Wholesale Acquisition Cost.
Manufacturers use five analytical frameworks in parallel when setting a launch price, but these frameworks do not serve as independent checks on one another. They instead function as a rationalization stack whose combined output yields the highest defensible number.
The first framework, analog benchmarking, positions a new drug within the pricing corridor established by prior approvals. Analysts map the product against competitors and, for rare diseases lacking close comparators, against orphan precedents like Spinraza (approximately $750,000 per year at launch), Zolgensma (approximately $2.1 million), and Luxturna (approximately $850,000 per eye). This practice creates a ratchet effect: each new entrant prices above its predecessors to signal differentiation, progressively raising the class floor regardless of incremental therapeutic benefit. Analog benchmarking, therefore, becomes circular, with each new price justified by previous prices that manufacturers had already inflated.
The second framework, value-based modeling, establishes an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio relative to conventional willingness-to-pay thresholds of approximately $100,000–$150,000 per quality-adjusted life year (QALY).11,12 Manufacturers populate these models with favorable efficacy assumptions and expansive cost-offset claims to maximize the value-justified ceiling. Independent reviews consistently find that actual launch prices frequently exceed these thresholds, indicating that value-based frameworks function more as post hoc justification than as binding constraints.13
The third framework, willingness-to-pay research, employs conjoint analysis, the Van Westendorp Price Sensitivity Meter, Gabor-Granger testing, and monadic methods.7,8,9,10 In the U.S. pharmaceutical market, however, respondents evaluate WAC with the expectation that rebates and discounts will follow. As a result, the methods measure tolerance for a list price at which market participants do not expect to transact.
The fourth framework, discounted cash flow recovery modeling, works backward from target returns and capitalized research and development (R&D) costs. Manufacturers frequently cite development cost estimates, such as the approximately $2.6 billion figure reported by DiMasi et al..15 This approach embeds a sunk-cost recovery logic, treating historical development expenditures as costs to be recaptured through future pricing despite their limited relevance to contemporary market willingness to pay.
The fifth and ultimately decisive framework is strategic rebate-room engineering. Manufacturers set WAC above the value-justified level to create the rebate headroom necessary to secure formulary access. For example, Humira's list price increased repeatedly over more than a decade while AbbVie's realized net price remained relatively stable because progressively larger rebates offset the increases.15 Similar patterns have been documented for insulin products before their recent list-price reductions, illustrating how WAC inflation often reflected rebate economics rather than increasing manufacturer revenue.15 Without sufficient headroom, manufacturers cannot fund competitive rebate bids, and PBMs may deny preferred formulary placement2. The central finding of this theme is therefore not that one framework dominates the others, but that all five frameworks systematically point upward. None approximates eventual ASP.
Theme two: the gross-to-net gap is structurally inevitable (RQ2)
The second theme addresses the second research question: why WAC systematically overstates realized ASP. Table 6 maps the five structural forces to their supporting evidence, drawing on government records, statutory provisions, and industry estimates that collectively demonstrate that the divergence is structurally inevitable rather than incidental.
Table 6. Literature Mapping for RQ2 — Why does WAC systematically overstate the realized ASP?
| Source (Relevance to the Review) | Evidence Addressing the Question | Specific In-Text Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Fein / Drug Channels Institute:1,17 Gross-to-net magnitude | Quantifies the list-to-net gap and its trajectory, establishing the divergence as systemic, not incidental | Gross-to-net bubble reached $356B in 2024 (~$416B est. 2025); ASP lands at 40–60% of WAC, 30–40% in heavily rebated classes. |
| FTC;2 Chopra:16 PBM concentration and rebate walls | Explain how concentrated intermediaries convert list-price headroom into rebate revenue and foreclose lower-list competitors | ~95% of prescriptions managed by six PBMs; rebate walls foreclose lower-list-price alternatives regardless of clinical merit |
| Fein:18 340B volume growth | Documents one of the five structural forces widening the gap after launch | 340B purchases reached $81B in 2024 (+23%), a leading single source of manufacturer discounts |
| Choudhry et al.:19 Access barriers and utilization | Evidence base linking formulary restriction and cost-sharing to suppressed realized volume | Formulary/cost-sharing design measurably changes utilization, so realized ASP falls below launch-model assumptions |
| American Rescue Plan Act;20 HRSA (n.d.):29 Medicaid best-price and 340B statutes | Supply the statutory mechanics (best-price trap, uncapped Medicaid rebate) that make the divergence structurally inevitable. | Removal of the Medicaid rebate cap (effective 2024) lets rebate liability exceed AMP; best-price reset penalizes deep discounting. |
Note. RQ2 combines Tier 1 government/legal records with Tier 3 trade-institute estimates; the latter are triangulated and reported as the best available figures.
AMP = Average Manufacturer Price; ASP = Average Sales Price; FTC = Federal Trade Commission; HRSA = Health Resources and Services Administration; PBM = pharmacy benefit manager; WAC = Wholesale Acquisition Cost.
Because manufacturers construct WAC to maximize rebate headroom, the divergence between WAC and ASP is not a discount applied to a real market price. It is the predictable consequence of a price designed never to transact. Five structural forces widen the gap after launch. Viewed through an information-economics lens, the gross-to-net architecture creates substantial information asymmetry. Manufacturers, PBMs, insurers, providers, government programs, and patients each observe different prices for the same medicine, limiting price transparency and making efficient market comparisons increasingly difficult.15
First, the Medicaid best-price mechanism penalizes deep commercial discounting nonlinearly. Any commercial rebate that produces a net price below the current Medicaid best price effectively resets the statutory floor across all Medicaid units, creating a financial exposure that launch models frequently underestimate.
Second, rebate walls intensify as competition enters a therapeutic class. A product launched with 30% rebate headroom may face competitors willing to offer 50% rebates in exchange for exclusive formulary placement. These arrangements can exclude lower-list-price alternatives regardless of clinical merit, creating escalating pressure to maintain ever-larger rebate pools.16
Third, the continued expansion of the 340B program increases the proportion of units sold at deep statutory discounts. Program purchases exceeded $81 billion in 2024 and grew approximately 23% year-over-year, making 340B one of the largest discount channels in the pharmaceutical supply chain.18
Fourth, the IRA Part D manufacturer discount introduced a new mandatory deduction beginning in 2025. Because the provision did not exist when manufacturers developed many launch models, it represents an additional source of post-launch ASP erosion.
Fifth, prior authorization requirements and other utilization-management tools suppress realized volume. Although launch models frequently assume broader access, substantial evidence demonstrates that formulary restrictions reduce prescription fulfillment and patient utilization.19
These forces compound rather than operate independently. A single product may simultaneously experience best-price constraints, escalating rebate competition, expanding 340B exposure, IRA discounts, and utilization restrictions. The realized ASP often falls below even conservative launch assumptions.
The patient consequences follow directly from this structure. Plans frequently calculate cost sharing using WAC rather than the net price ultimately paid by the plan after rebates and discounts. Intermediaries capture the discount, while patients remain exposed to the inflated anchor price. The largest disparities occur in specialty categories where rebates are greatest, and patient financial burden is highest. The consequences extend beyond affordability. Because deductibles and coinsurance frequently reference list prices rather than realized net prices, patients with chronic illnesses, specialty medication needs, or high annual healthcare utilization bear a disproportionate share of financial burden. Such realities make pharmaceutical pricing policy simultaneously a question of economic efficiency and health equity.
Theme three: the rebate engine and the policy rupture (RQ3)
This theme addresses the third research question: how the IRA and MFN alter the underlying logic of list-price construction and compress the gross-to-net pricing architecture. Table 7 maps the policy, pricing, and observed-deflation evidence supporting this conclusion, linking each source to the specific mechanisms and findings discussed below. Because MFN implementation remains unsettled, the evidence supporting this theme is necessarily more provisional than that supporting Themes 1 and 2.
Table 7. Literature Mapping for RQ3 — How do the IRA and MFN alter the underlying logic of list-price construction?
| Source (Relevance to the Review) | Evidence Addressing the Question | Specific In-Text Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Inflation Reduction Act;3 ASPE:4 Medicare negotiation | Establishes that negotiated Maximum Fair Prices compress net prices and serve as commercial reference points | First-round negotiated prices ran 38–79% below list; Part D manufacturer discount adds a new post-launch drag |
| Exec. Order No. 14297;5 HHS:21 MFN regime | Shows MFN dismantles each pillar of WAC construction by anchoring to international net prices | U.S. prices tied to the lowest price in OECD countries, ≥60% U.S. GDP per capita, typically 40–75% below U.S. WAC |
| Fein:1,17 Observed WAC deflation. | Documents that the predicted compression is already underway in the list-price behavior | 20+ brands cut WAC in 2024–25; 15+ further cuts of −25% to −85% scheduled for 2026 (~$35–$40B gross revenue reduction) |
| White House:22,23 Implementation pathway | Provides the implementation signal cases (voluntary agreements, direct-to-consumer channel) that route around the rebate apparatus | 17 manufacturers signed MFN agreements by April 2026; a direct-to-consumer platform bypasses PBM intermediation |
Note. RQ3 rests on Tier 1 legal and government sources triangulated with current Tier 3 trade reporting; because MFN implementation is unsettled, these findings are conditional on implementation.
ASPE = Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation; GDP = gross domestic product; HHS = U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; IRA = Inflation Reduction Act; MFN = most-favored-nation; OECD = Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development; WAC = Wholesale Acquisition Cost.
The rebate engine explains the otherwise puzzling pattern of sustained list-price inflation over the past three decades. PBMs create preferred-formulary opportunities, manufacturers submit confidential rebate bids expressed as percentages of WAC, and PBMs select the highest-value offer. Historically, PBMs retained a portion of those rebates and passed the remainder to plan sponsors to offset premiums.2 Throughout the process, patient cost sharing remains tied to WAC.
This structure rewards higher list prices because higher WAC supports larger absolute rebates. From 2010 through 2023, brand-drug list prices increased repeatedly while net prices remained relatively flat or declined. These increases were often rebate-maintenance events rather than revenue-expansion events. Each new entrant launched at a higher WAC to support a larger rebate, and incumbents increased WAC to preserve rebate dollars demanded by formulary intermediaries.
The IRA and MFN now attack this logic from different directions, and evidence of deflationary pressure is already emerging. Insulin manufacturers reduced WAC by 50–80% on products with more than $20 billion in cumulative prior sales. The removal of the Medicaid rebate cap created additional incentives to reduce list prices, and manufacturers announced substantial WAC reductions across numerous brands between 2024 and 2026.1,17,20 The IRA further contributes through Maximum Fair Price negotiation and the Part D manufacturer discount. ASPE reported initial negotiated prices at 38–79% below list price,4 and the public visibility of Maximum Fair Prices creates a reference effect that may compress commercial pricing even where no direct mandate exists.
MFN represents a more fundamental disruption. Rather than imposing a simple price ceiling, it challenges the entire architecture that made rebate-driven pricing rational. By anchoring U.S. prices to the lowest prices observed among comparable Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, MFN replaces comparator list prices with internationally negotiated net prices. This change weakens analog benchmarking, eliminates much of the rebate room that historically justified elevated WAC levels, and undermines revenue models built on legacy U.S. pricing assumptions.5,21
The policy, therefore, affects not merely the level of prices but the mechanisms through which manufacturers establish prices. The administration has pursued implementation through voluntary manufacturer agreements, CMS payment models, and direct-to-consumer purchasing pathways that reduce reliance on traditional PBM intermediation.22,23 If fully implemented, MFN would transform the economic foundations of the rebate system itself, replacing a model built on escalating list prices and negotiated rebates with one anchored more directly to externally observed transaction prices.
A further consequence operates outside U.S. borders but feeds directly back into domestic prices. Because the benchmark ties the U.S. price to prices paid in a basket of reference countries, the international prices that anchor it become strategically consequential, and manufacturers acquire an incentive to manage (delay, restrict, or withhold) launches in the very markets whose prices would set that floor.24
The Trump administration has operationalized MFN through three Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) pilots (GENEROUS, or GENErating cost Reductions fOr U.S. Medicaid, for Medicaid; GLOBE, or Global Benchmark for Efficient Drug Pricing, for Part B; and GUARD, or Guarding U.S. Medicare Against Rising Drug Costs, for Part D), with each using different benchmark methodologies and reference-country baskets. For example, GENEROUS references the second-lowest average selling net price across eight reference markets.24
Early evidence suggests the incentive is already changing behavior: in matched twelve-month windows around the May 2025 executive order, new-product launches fell 29.9% across the nineteen-country reference basket and 37.8% in the eleven European Union member states subject to Joint Clinical Assessment, while U.S. launches fell 10.5% and U.S. non-orphan launches, the products whose value is dominated by U.S. revenue, were flat (0.0%).24 That divergence (i.e., the steep declines in the reference markets against near-flat U.S. activity in the same products) is the signature of a reference-pricing spillover, in which manufacturers preserve the U.S. launch while pulling back from the markets that anchor the U.S. benchmark. The domestic mechanism this paper traces thus has an international mirror: the same logic that compresses WAC also reshapes the global sequence in which medicines reach patients.
The IRA and MFN represent the most significant challenge to the rebate-driven pricing model since its emergence. The evidence reviewed here suggests that the resulting compression is not simply a temporary reduction in prices but a structural disruption of the incentives that produced the gross-to-net bubble in the first place.
Discussion
Interpretation
This research set out to answer three questions, and the findings address each in turn. Regarding the first research question (how manufacturers construct an initial WAC), this analysis showed that the launch price emerges not from a single calculation. However, from five analytical frameworks (analog benchmarking, value/QALY modeling, willingness-to-pay research, DCF recovery, and rebate-room engineering) that operate as a rationalization stack rather than as independent checks, each documented in a peer-reviewed or government source in Table 5.
On the second research question (why WAC systematically overstates the realized ASP), the analysis identified five structural forces (the Medicaid best-price trap, escalating rebate walls, 340B volume growth, the IRA Part D discount, and access barriers) that drive realized ASP to 40–60% of WAC, and demonstrated that this divergence is the predictable output of a price built never to transact rather than an incidental discount (Table 6).
Relative to the third research question (how the IRA and MFN alter the underlying logic), the analysis traced how Medicare negotiation and MFN reference pricing dismantle each pillar of the construction architecture, with the predicted deflation already visible in observed WAC cuts (Table 7). The literature-mapping tables make this coverage auditable: every claim that answers a research question is tied to a verifiable source, its specific in-text evidence, and its location in the paper. The three answers, taken together, converge on a single interpretation.
That interpretation is this: the gross-to-net gap is not inefficiency at the margin. Instead, it reflects the system operating exactly as designed. The list price is an instrument for rebate generation, not a signal of value or cost. Each of the five construction frameworks, examined in isolation, looks like a disciplined analytical exercise; assembled, they form a rationalization stack whose only consistent output is the maximum defensible number. The $356 billion bubble is the aggregate measure of that design, the distance between what the system charges and what it collects.1 Reform efforts that treat the gap as a fixable inefficiency, rather than as the load-bearing feature it is, will misjudge how the system responds when policy compresses that headroom.
An important nuance emerging from recent analyses of the CMS GENEROUS model is that not all forms of most-favored-nation (MFN) pricing necessarily produce the same policy effects.25 Although this review argues that MFN pricing compresses the rebate headroom that historically supported elevated WACs, the GENEROUS model illustrates that the more durable policy innovation may be centralized federal negotiation rather than international reference pricing itself.25 By creating a federal framework for negotiating coverage criteria and standardized contracting, CMS may reduce administrative burden and enable sophisticated payment arrangements that many state Medicaid programs lack the resources to develop independently25. The long-term policy significance of MFN may reside less in the specific benchmark used and more in the institutional infrastructure created for coordinated purchasing and value-based contracting.25
Stakeholder implications
The disruption falls unevenly. Manufacturers must rebuild launch financial models around net price rather than WAC, and the firms most exposed are single-franchise companies whose entire valuation rests on a U.S. WAC-based revenue projection for one product; diversified firms can absorb compression across a portfolio that a single-asset company cannot. PBMs face a more existential challenge. As the WAC-to-net gap closes, the economic basis for rebate intermediation evaporates, which is why the largest intermediaries have begun shifting toward transparent fee-for-service models and why direct-to-consumer channels that bypass formulary negotiation represent a structural rather than incremental threat to their role.23 Patients occupy the most contingent position of all. They benefit only under two conditions that must both hold: the WAC must trend toward net levels, and policymakers must redesign cost-sharing to compute against net price rather than the inflated anchor. If rebates merely shrink while WAC and WAC-based cost-sharing persist, the intermediaries adjust, and patients see nothing. In essence, the deflation accrues entirely upstream.
The implications for Medicaid deserve separate consideration because Medicaid already receives statutory rebates that frequently produce some of the lowest net prices in the U.S. pharmaceutical market.25 International reference pricing may generate relatively modest additional savings for many mature products while producing larger effects for newly launched, high-cost specialty medicines that have not yet accumulated substantial statutory or inflation-based rebates .25 This distinction reinforces the importance of interpreting MFN as a targeted rather than universally transformative pricing mechanism.25 It also suggests that future policy evaluations should distinguish between mature therapeutic classes and innovative therapies whose launch prices remain largely unaffected by existing rebate structures .25
The unresolved tension
Beneath the mechanics lies a genuine and unresolved tension. For three decades, the U.S. market has cross-subsidized global pharmaceutical research and development by paying prices that other countries' health technology assessment (HTA) systems would never accept. The IRA's negotiation program and the MFN benchmark both compress U.S. net revenue toward international averages, and both support the administration's rebalancing argument. That argument implies Americans should not fund the world's drug development through inflated prices.
This debate increasingly extends beyond pharmaceutical pricing itself. Because expected reimbursement influences projected future cash flows, pricing policy also affects capital allocation, venture financing, and ultimately the scientific areas toward which innovation is directed. Further, the industry's innovation-risk argument, that compressed U.S. revenue will reduce the capital flowing into early-stage research, carries real empirical support. This paper does not adjudicate that tension. It observes instead that the rebate architecture obscured the tension for years by making the true U.S. net price invisible; as MFN and Maximum Fair Price disclosure render net prices legible, the trade-off between affordability and innovation incentives becomes harder to evade and will demand an explicit policy answer rather than an accounting one.
A price-ceiling lens: administered caps on a price that never cleared
Standard microeconomic theory treats a binding price ceiling as a legal maximum set below the market-clearing price, which moves buyers and sellers along fixed demand and supply curves and produces excess demand, a shortage.26 Figure 3 presents the standard price-ceiling framework adapted to the branded pharmaceutical market and illustrates why the expected shortage outcome is unlikely to emerge in the short run. The IRA Maximum Fair Price and the MFN benchmark are, in this language, administered price ceilings, though they differ in scope, benchmark, timing, and depth, as summarized in Table 8. Nonetheless, two features of the U.S. brand-drug market keep this textbook prediction from applying directly, and naming them sharpens what the findings above actually imply.
Table 8. The IRA and MFN as Administered Price Ceilings: A Comparison
| Feature | IRA negotiation | MFN pricing |
|---|---|---|
| Scope | Selected high-spend Medicare drugs | Potentially a broad range of branded drugs |
| Benchmark | Negotiated Medicare Maximum Fair Price | Lowest price among comparable OECD countries |
| Timing | Years after launch (9 yr small molecule, 13 yr biologic) | Potentially much earlier in the product lifecycle |
| Price reduction | Moderate to substantial (38–79% below list, first round) | Potentially very large (estimates of ~30–80%) |
| Innovation impact | Concentrated on mature products | Potentially broad across the product lifecycle |
| Price-ceiling interpretation | A localized ceiling, often still well above marginal cost | A much lower ceiling applied across the market |
Note. Both policies act as administered price ceilings in the sense of Baye and Prince.26 Because branded drugs are patent-protected and priced far above marginal cost, neither is expected to create short-run shortages of existing products; the consequential question is whether each shifts the long-run supply of innovation, a margin taken up in the companion analysis (York28). IRA = Inflation Reduction Act; MFN = most-favored-nation; OECD = Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
The practical implementation of MFN policies also remains considerably more uncertain than the theoretical framework alone might suggest.25 International reference pricing depends on accurate observation of foreign net prices. However, confidential rebate agreements in many reference countries limit transparency and complicate benchmark construction. Manufacturers may also respond strategically by delaying product launches or modifying pricing strategies in countries included within the reference basket, thereby altering the benchmark itself.25 These implementation challenges reinforce that observed market outcomes will depend not only on the statutory design of MFN policies but also on manufacturer participation, reporting accuracy, and evolving international launch strategies. Early evidence from voluntary demonstration programs should be interpreted cautiously because participating manufacturers and products are unlikely to represent the broader pharmaceutical market.25
Figure 3 illustrates the first point. In the market for an approved branded drug, the short-run supply curve is often nearly vertical because the selling price remains far above the marginal manufacturing cost. As a result, a binding ceiling below the pre-policy price primarily reduces producer surplus while generating little change in quantity supplied. The immediate effect is, therefore, a transfer rather than a shortage. This observation differs from the standard competitive-market model, in which a ceiling set below the equilibrium price produces a substantial quantity mismatch between supply and demand.
The first complication is the one this paper has documented throughout. It is that the price the ceiling caps, the WAC, is not a market-clearing price but an engineered anchor that no payer pays. A ceiling laid over a non-transacting list price, therefore, does not bind on the quantity exchanged in the way the competitive model assumes. Whether it bites depends on a distinction the gross-to-net architecture makes essential: a ceiling that compresses WAC down toward the already-lower realized net price (ASP) operates largely as a redistribution away from rebate-capturing intermediaries rather than as a constraint on manufacturer revenue, whereas a ceiling that binds below net price is the case in which classic supply effects appear. The first-round negotiated prices, which ran 38–79% below list,4 and the MFN benchmark, typically 40–75% below WAC, span both possibilities depending on the drug's prior rebate depth. This observation is precisely why the policy's incidence is uneven across products.
The second complication is structural. It is that branded drugs under patent are not sold in competitive markets but rather by single-source firms with market power. As Figure 3 illustrates, a ceiling imposed below the prevailing monopoly price, but above marginal cost, generally does not produce the shortage predicted by the textbook competitive model. For a monopolist, a price ceiling set below the unconstrained monopoly price but above marginal cost does not generate a shortage and can, in fact, raise output toward the competitive level because the cap flattens the firm's effective marginal-revenue schedule up to the ceiling quantity; a shortage emerges only once policymakers push the ceiling below the competitive price.27 In the short run, then, a cap on a patent-protected drug behaves less like the shortage-inducing ceiling of the textbook and more like a transfer of surplus from the manufacturer and its intermediaries to payers and patients.
This transfer can improve static welfare by reducing the deadweight loss a monopoly price creates. A market-specific mechanism may amplify the welfare gain: patient cost-sharing is often computed on WAC rather than net price. A ceiling that lowers WAC may therefore reduce out-of-pocket exposure even when manufacturer net revenue changes little. This ceiling lowers WAC, which mechanically lowers out-of-pocket exposure even where it leaves manufacturer net revenue largely intact. Such action is undoing part of the distortion the rebate economy itself manufactured.
The consequential question is, therefore, not whether these ceilings create a short-run shortage (in this market, they generally will not). Instead, it is whether they merely move firms along a fixed supply curve or shift the long-run supply of innovation leftward as producers facing lower expected returns withdraw investment.26 That dynamic margin is where the affordability-versus-innovation tension of Section 6.3 turns. This review cannot resolve it because the relevant evidence is the forward-looking response of research-and-development capital rather than the contemporaneous list-price behavior analyzed here. The companion analysis of how the IRA and MFN reprice therapeutic areas and platforms takes up exactly that question, finding early evidence that the long-run curve is already shifting and, importantly, that it shifts unevenly across modalities rather than uniformly.28 Independent evidence points the same way: a stratified analysis of European launch activity after the May 2025 executive order finds the pullback already visible and uneven, concentrated in the non-orphan, U.S.-revenue-dominated products for which delaying or restricting a reference-market launch is most defensible, while orphan products, whose value depends more on rest-of-world revenue, have so far proven more resilient.24
The price-ceiling lens thus reframes the paper's central caution. Figure 3 suggests that the immediate effect of administered price ceilings in branded pharmaceutical markets is primarily a welfare-relevant transfer rather than a shortage. Their lasting significance, however, depends on whether lower expected returns eventually alter investment behavior and reduce the future supply of innovation. That long-run response has only begun to be observed.
Contributions
This review makes three contributions that the preceding analysis now substantiates. The first is theoretical and integrative. The pricing-methodology literature, the PBM rebate political economy, and the 2022–2026 policy disruption are ordinarily studied apart; by following a single artifact, the WAC, from construction through the price waterfall into the compression now underway, the review shows they are one causal system rather than three subjects. The decisive insight is that the gross-to-net gap is not inefficiency to be corrected but the designed output of a list price built to generate rebates; only the integrated view makes that legible, because each literature alone sees a fragment.
The second is methodological. Because the data that govern this market (realized net prices and rebate splits) are confidential and cannot be pooled, a conventional systematic review is impossible. The paper instead demonstrates a disciplined gray-literature method: a three-tier provenance scheme (Tier 1 government and legal records, Tier 2 peer-reviewed methodology, Tier 3 trade and consultancy estimates) governed by a verifiability rule under which every cited claim must trace to a DOI, PMID, or official URL, with Tier 3 figures triangulated against higher tiers and flagged where they rest on a single source (Table 3). The literature-mapping tables (Tables 5–7) extend this contribution by tying each research question to its specific evidence, anchoring findings, and location in the paper, and by making transparent the gradient of certainty from RQ1 to RQ3. The template is reusable for any policy domain whose core data are proprietary.
The third is practical. The review converts a diffuse, partly proprietary literature into an actionable account for clinicians, payers, and policymakers. It identifies precisely where reform would bind. Such is not on the headline list price but on whether WAC falls, whether patient cost-sharing is recomputed on net price, and whether formulary design and net-price transparency are reformed in concert. These distinguish changes that would reach patients from those that would merely redistribute rebate value upstream. By naming the load-bearing feature of the system rather than its surface symptoms, the analysis gives reformers a map of which levers move patient cost and which do not.
Limitations and future work
Several limitations qualify the findings and suggest directions for future research. First, confidentiality constrains precision. Because net prices, rebate flows, and manufacturer–payer agreements are generally not public, the quantitative figures presented throughout are best-available estimates derived from triangulation across multiple sources. The analysis emphasizes directional relationships and presents ranges rather than precise point estimates where the underlying data warrant caution. A more definitive assessment will require greater transparency regarding net pricing and rebate distribution.
Second, the gray-literature component of the evidence base introduces potential framing bias. Industry consultancies, trade associations, and policy institutes may possess commercial, political, or organizational incentives that influence how they generate and report estimates. To mitigate this risk, the analysis triangulated all Tier 3 evidence against Tier 1 and Tier 2 sources whenever possible and exercised caution when findings relied primarily on a single gray-literature source. Nevertheless, some uncertainty remains regarding the precise magnitude of reported effects.
Third, the policy environment itself remains unsettled. The MFN framework currently relies substantially on voluntary manufacturer agreements and payment-model structures whose final implementation, legal durability, and political sustainability remain uncertain. A federal court enjoined an earlier MFN initiative introduced in 2020 before implementation, and the current framework may likewise evolve through regulatory revision, litigation, legislative action, or industry response. The magnitude of the MFN-related effects discussed here should be viewed as conditional on implementation rather than as settled outcomes.
These limitations do not undermine the study's central contribution, which is structural rather than quantitative-causal. The analysis explains how IRA and MFN pricing mechanisms alter the economic incentives underlying biopharmaceutical innovation, investment, and commercialization. However, it does not estimate the precise elasticity of investment, valuation, or net pricing with respect to individual policy levers. The conclusions from this review, therefore, concern the direction and structure of the observed effects more than their exact magnitude.
Future research should extend the analysis using longitudinal post-implementation data. Important priorities include tracking modality-specific venture capital investment and clinical-trial initiation through the full implementation of MFN-related payment models; measuring whether WAC-to-net price convergence occurs as predicted; assessing whether reductions in net prices translate into lower patient out-of-pocket costs or remain partially disconnected because of benefit-design structures; examining whether the predicted contraction in single-franchise small-molecule valuations materializes in realized financing outcomes; and evaluating whether the strategic adaptations identified here, including biologic migration, orphan-indication anchoring, younger-population targeting, and increased investment in cell-and-gene modalities: persist or reverse as the policy environment stabilizes. Such longitudinal evidence will be necessary to convert the structural relationships identified in this study into more precise causal estimates of policy effects on innovation, investment, pricing, and entrepreneurial strategy.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the central policy question is no longer whether pharmaceutical prices will fall but whether the United States will continue operating with three different prices for the same medicine: the published list price, the confidential net price, and the price patients pay at the pharmacy counter. Until those measures are better aligned, the gross-to-net architecture will continue to distort incentives throughout the pharmaceutical supply chain. What is no longer tenable is the status quo. Such is a reported price engineered as fiction, patient cost-sharing pegged to that fiction, and a $356 billion annual bubble measuring the distance between what the system charges and what it receives.1 Manufacturers establish the list price as an instrument for rebate generation. This construction makes the gross-to-net gap structurally inevitable and concentrated its harm on patients, and the IRA and MFN now compress the headroom on which the entire apparatus depends. The structural transformation is real. Whether it reaches patients depends not on the size of the headline savings but rather on whether the system reforms cost-sharing, formulary design, and net-price transparency in concert. Currently, that distribution is not yet determined and needs further stakeholder conversations to reform the current dynamic.
Declarations
- Acknowledgments
- The authors gratefully acknowledge Joseph Chang, Stephanie Cheng, and Christie Trinh for their contributions to manuscript review and editorial guidance.
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Article information
Authors
- John M. YorkErnest Mario School of Pharmacy, Rutgers University; Cranfield School of Management; Anne Burnett Marion School of Medicine, Texas Christian UniversityCorresponding author · [email protected]
- Bhumika S. DevnaniErnest Mario School of Pharmacy, Rutgers University
- Gehna ShahErnest Mario School of Pharmacy, Rutgers University
- Rayan K. SalihErnest Mario School of Pharmacy, Rutgers University
How to cite
York, J. M., Devnani, B. S., et al., 2026. Constructing the Unpaid Price: The Pharmacy Benefit Manager Gross-to-Net Fallacy Leading to Emerging United States Drug Pricing Policy Changes. Medical Research Archives, [online] 14(10). https://doi.org/10.18103/mra.2026.0615
Record
- Journal
- Medical Research Archives
- Issue
- Vol 14 No 10 (2026)
- Section
- Policy Articles
- Published
- 31 October 2026
- ISSN
- 2375-1924
- Downloads
- 93
Copyright and licence
Published by the European Society of Medicine under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence (CC BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original authors and source are credited.