Key findings

  • 68%fall in early-stage venture investment in small-molecule assets after the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act, leaving large-molecule investment about ten times larger by 2024
  • 9 vs 13 yearsafter approval before small molecules and biologics, respectively, face Medicare price negotiation
  • ~4.8× vs ~1.1–1.2×approximate ratio of United States to international prices for cardiovascular drugs versus orphan and cell-and-gene treatments
  • 30%cut to projected peak revenue can more than halve a preclinical asset's present value once staged probabilities and discounting compound

Abstract

Background
United States pharmaceutical pricing policy does not act uniformly across the drug development pipeline. The 2022 Inflation Reduction Act exposes small-molecule drugs to Medicare price negotiation nine years after approval. However, it protects biologics for thirteen years, and the 2025 Most-Favored-Nation executive order ties United States prices to the lowest price paid by comparable wealthy nations. This study examines how these two policies reprice therapeutic areas and technology platforms, and how that repricing feeds back into early-stage investment.
Methods
This mixed-methods review combines a structured synthesis of peer and non-peer review publications, a discounted-cash-flow-transmission argument, and a therapeutic-area exposure-scoring framework, with every cited claim checked for a verifiable source. The analysis evaluated the six therapeutic areas and four platform classes on multiple factors, including international price differential, Medicare-population concentration, negotiation timeline, and orphan-exemption eligibility.
Results
Early-stage venture investment in small-molecule assets fell by roughly 68% after the 2022 law, leaving large-molecule investment about ten times larger by 2024, and post-approval oncology trials declined more for small molecules than biologics. Price exposure varies sharply by therapeutic area: United States prices run about 4.8 times higher for cardiovascular drugs but only 1.1 to 1.2 times higher for orphan and cell-and-gene treatments. Cardiovascular, metabolic, immunologic, and Medicare-aged neurological assets face the highest combined exposure; orphan and cell-and-gene assets face the lowest. A 30% cut to projected peak revenue more than halves a preclinical asset's present value once staged probabilities and discounting compound.
Conclusions
Together with broader price deflation, these two policies represent the most significant repricing of risk-adjusted pharmaceutical research and development returns in a generation, and capital is already shifting toward biologics, orphan indications, and cell-and-gene therapies.

Introduction

The United States pharmaceutical pricing policy has entered its most consequential period of change in a generation, and the change does not distribute evenly. The 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) granted Medicare the authority to negotiate prices for high-cost drugs, and wrote a structural asymmetry into the statute: a small-molecule drug becomes eligible for price setting nine years after approval, while a biologic is protected for thirteen years.1–2 Three years later, the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) executive order signed on May 12, 2025, added a second, orthogonal pressure by tying United States prices to the lowest price paid by a comparable wealthy nation, an exposure that differs sharply across therapeutic areas.3–4 Together, these policies reprice the pharmaceutical market by modality and indication rather than applying a uniform discount.

This repricing does not stop at commercial-stage products. It transmits backward, through the discounted-cash-flow (DCF) models that investors use to value early-stage assets, into the preclinical decisions that determine which medicines get developed at all: when a policy lowers a drug class's projected peak revenue, it lowers the present value of every asset in that class, including assets years from a first-in-human trial. The signal is already visible: early-stage venture capital investment in small-molecule lead assets fell by roughly 68% after the 2022 law, leaving large-molecule investment about ten times larger by 2024.5

Despite this signal, the existing evidence addresses the two policies in isolation. The peer-reviewed literature on the 2022 law documents the small-molecule investment penalty but does not account for the newer policy's area-specific price differentials.5–8 The emerging literature on that newer policy quantifies how international price gaps vary by therapeutic area but rarely connects those differentials to the preclinical DCF mechanics the earlier literature illuminates.4,9 Neither strand traces repricing back to the seed- and preclinical-stage valuations that determine which medicines enter development, leaving investors and policymakers without a shared map of differential exposure.

This paper addresses this gap by pursuing three questions: through what mechanism does pricing policy reach preclinical investment decisions; how does exposure to that mechanism differ across therapeutic areas and platform modalities; and what strategic adaptations are ventures and investors deploying in response. The scope is United States preclinical and early clinical ventures from 2018 through 2026, across six therapeutic areas and four platform classes.

The paper makes three contributions. First, it integrates the two literatures into a single analytic frame.4–9 Second, it formalizes the transmission mechanism through a DCF argument that makes explicit the channel that the financing data only imply. Third, it operationalizes that frame as a modality map, an exposure score for six therapeutic areas and four platform classes, that investors and policymakers can read directly.

The paper proceeds through a review of the relevant literature, the analysis methods, results, and discussion, before concluding with critical take-home points.

Background and Literature Review

The relevant evidence spans three strands: peer-reviewed studies of the Inflation Reduction Act's investment impact, emerging analyses of the Most-Favored-Nation order's valuation effects, and the broader biopharmaceutical financing literature. A fourth subsection identifies the gap this paper fills.

The policy architecture

The Inflation Reduction Act's Drug Price Negotiation Program authorizes the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to set a Maximum Fair Price for selected high-spend drugs, with eligibility tied to time since approval. CMS may select small-molecule drugs seven years after approval, but biologics only after eleven years, with negotiated prices applying in year thirteen.2,10 This four-year differential, often called the pill penalty, was a deliberate legislative choice that CMS declined to revise during implementation, citing the statute's explicit language.10 The first negotiation cycle selected ten drugs, seven of them small molecules, and produced prices 38% to 79% below list.11

The MFN order operates on a different axis, directing the Department of Health and Human Services to set price targets pegged to the lowest price paid by an Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development country with per-capita gross domestic product at least 60% of the United States level.3,12 Because international price gaps differ by therapeutic area, this exposure is intrinsically area-specific rather than uniform, a feature central to this paper's argument.

The IRA investment-impact literature

A growing body of peer-reviewed literature documents the differential effect of Medicare price negotiation on small molecules. Analyzing 161 lead assets and 619 individual investments, one study found that aggregate small-molecule investment declined by approximately 68% after the law's passage, with individual investments falling by roughly half as exposure to the Medicare-aged population increased; the equivalent test for large molecules was statistically inconclusive.5 Had the decline merely reflected a post-pandemic market correction, both classes would have contracted similarly.

Complementary work examines downstream clinical development. A difference-in-differences analysis of post-approval oncology trials found a substantially larger decline for small molecules than for biologics, consistent with the shorter negotiation clock,8 and a related study reached a similar conclusion more broadly for post-approval oncology innovation.6 Thirty of the fifty highest-spending Medicare Part D drugs in 2020 were multi-indication small molecules whose subsequent-indication development historically took years of post-approval research, precisely what the nine-year clock disincentivizes.7 A financing baseline shows that roughly three-quarters of venture capital historically flowed to small-molecule programs, concentrated in the early-phase trials now most exposed.13

The Most-Favored-Nation valuation literature

Analysis of the newer order's valuation effects is dominated by consultancy and policy work, reflecting its recency. One analysis quantified the therapeutic-area structure of price differentials, reporting that United States prices run about 4.8 times higher for cardiovascular disease but only about 1.1 times higher for orphan disease and 1.2 times for hematology, with cell and gene therapies similarly compressed.4 Because the order narrows the largest differentials, assets in high-differential areas face the steepest repricing, a dynamic one analysis framed as an MFN paradox, and contemporaneous reviews cataloged the resulting questions about access, innovation, and coverage.9,14

The financing-environment literature

The investment signal must be read against a financing environment that has favored capital concentration over abundance since 2022. Industry trackers report that aggregate United States biopharmaceutical venture capital stabilized near pre-pandemic levels after the 2021-2022 surge, with 2024 totals around $15 billion and a late-stage recovery through 2025 even as the number of funded companies narrowed.15–16 In a concentrated market, marginal capital is unusually sensitive to expected returns, which amplifies the DCF transmission this paper describes. Hence, when policy lowers a modality's projected value, capital migrates to whichever modality still clears investors' return threshold. This point reflects standard venture principles. Early-stage biotechnology investors allocate capital based on expected risk-adjusted returns rather than current revenue, and because preclinical assets carry high technical uncertainty and long timelines, modest reductions in projected peak revenue can push expected net present value below required hurdle rates years before commercialization.17

The gap this paper addresses

Existing studies typically isolate one policy. The Medicare negotiation literature rarely incorporates area-specific differentials, and the newer valuation literature rarely connects to the preclinical DCF mechanics the negotiation literature illuminates. Few sources integrate both into a single cross-modality, cross-indication exposure map tied to early-stage valuation. This paper fills that gap.

Methods

Design: a mixed-method analytic review

This study comprises a mixed-method analytic review with three components: a structured synthesis of investment and policy studies literature (gray and peer review) following Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines,18 a discounted-cash-flow transmission argument, and a therapeutic-area exposure-scoring framework. This design suits a central question that is interpretive and forward-looking, focused on how a still-evolving policy environment reshapes investment incentives, rather than one answerable by pooling homogeneous effect estimates. Much of the decisive evidence on private valuation and financing sits in proprietary or gray literature, so the method emphasizes transparent sourcing and triangulation over meta-analytic pooling.

Source identification, screening, and selection

The review followed a PRISMA-informed identification and screening process (Figure 1). It drew on investment and policy studies (gray and peer review) from PubMed, Google Scholar, and journal websites, alongside gray-literature sources including government and legal records, financing trackers, consultancy analyses, and industry news. Retained sources were classified by evidence tier and verification standard (Table 1). After removing duplicates and ineligible records, titles and abstracts were screened for relevance, and remaining items assessed in full; the final synthesis retained 29 sources. Every retained peer-reviewed citation was independently verified through Google Scholar and confirmed against an accessible link.

Figure 1. PRISMA-Informed Flow of Source Identification, Screening, and Selection Note. Flow adapted from the PRISMA 2020 statement for a mixed-method analytic review with two source streams. Counts illustrate the screening logic; verifiability (traceable to a DOI, PMID, or official URL and confirmed via Google Scholar) governed eligibility.

Table 1. Evidence Tiers and Verification Status of Retained Sources

TierSource typeRepresentative sourcesVerification
Peer-reviewedJournals with DOI/PMIDSchulthess et al. (2025); Zheng et al. (2025); Odouard et al. (2025); Patterson et al. (2024); Grabowski et al. (2024); Chambers et al. (2023)DOI + Google Scholar
Government / legalStatute, executive order, agencyIRA (2022); EO 14297 (2025); ASPE (2024); CRS (2023)Official URL
Trade/consultancyConsultancy, think tank, financing, newsSimon-Kucher (2026); CSIS (2026); ITIF (2025); BioPharma Dive (2024)Official URL; triangulated

DOI: Digital object identifier; PMID: PubMed reference number; URL: Uniform resource locator

The discounted-cash-flow transmission model

The analytical spine of the paper is a DCF transmission argument. An early-stage asset's value is the present value of its projected cash flows, multiplied by the cumulative probability of surviving each development stage and discounted at a rate reflecting biopharmaceutical risk, commonly 12% to 15% over a ten- to fifteen-year horizon (Figures 2 and 3). Pricing policy enters through the peak net revenue term: when the 2022 law shortens the pricing window or the newer order lowers the achievable price, projected peak net revenue falls, and that reduction propagates back to the earliest stage. Because distant, heavily discounted, probability-weighted cash flows dominate early-stage value, even a proportional revenue reduction can compound into a much larger reduction in present value. The model does not require precise revenue forecasts, only the directional claim that lower expected prices lower present values.

Figure 2. Discounted-Cash-Flow Sensitivity: How Price Compression Transmits to Preclinical Value Note. Schematic illustration of the DCF transmission argument (Section 3.3). A reduction in projected peak net revenue lowers present value roughly in proportion to the extent that stage-gated probabilities and discounting are applied; once those compound, the erosion of a fragile preclinical asset's value is even larger. IRA = Inflation Reduction Act; MFN = Most-favored-nation.
Figure 3. Divergence of Early-Stage Venture Capital by Molecule Type After the IRA Note. Values are illustrative of the finding in Schulthess et al. (2025) that aggregate small-molecule early-stage investment fell by approximately 68% after the IRA, leaving large-molecule investment roughly ten times larger by 2024. Figures are directional, not audited totals.

A simplified illustration makes the mechanism concrete. For a preclinical small-molecule asset, shortening the pre-negotiation pricing window to nine years truncates the highest-margin years of the revenue curve; layering a lower international reference price on top of that shortened window compounds the reduction, since a shorter window and a lower price multiply rather than add. When the compounded reduction reaches 30% or more, applying stage-gated survival probabilities can more than halve the asset's residual present value, pushing it below the return threshold venture capital requires.

This sensitivity is why the effect appears first in early-stage financing rather than in late-stage pipelines or marketed products, which have already cleared most development risk or generate cash regardless: it is the preclinical asset, valued entirely on a distant, fragile projection, whose investability is most sensitive to a price change a decade hence.5

Exposure-scoring framework

To compare therapeutic areas, the study scores each on three dimensions: the United States-to-international price differential, which proxies for exposure to the newer pricing order; Medicare-population concentration, which proxies for exposure to Medicare price negotiation; and modality protection, capturing whether an area's assets are predominantly small molecules or biologics. Scores are qualitative (low, moderate, or high) and triangulated across peer-reviewed and consultancy sources rather than presented as precise cardinal estimates. The resulting map appears in Table 2 and Figure 4.

Table 2. Therapeutic-Area Exposure to Combined IRA and MFN Repricing

Therapeutic areaUnited States-to-International Differential (MFN risk)Medicare Exposure (IRA risk)Small-molecule RelianceCombined Exposure
Cardiovascular/metabolic (GLP-1)~4.8× (high)HighHighVery high
Immunology / autoimmune~3.5–4.0× (high)ModerateModerateHigh
Oncology~2.5–3.5× (mod–high)HighModerateModerate–high
CNS / neurodegeneration~2.0–3.0× (moderate)HighHighHigh (Medicare-aged)
Rare disease/orphan~1.1–1.2× (low)LowModerateLow–moderate
Cell & gene therapy~1.2–1.5× (low)LowLowLow

Note. Differentials from Simon-Kucher (2026); modality timelines from the Inflation Reduction Act (2022) and CRS (2023). Ratings are qualitative and triangulated across peer-reviewed and consultancy sources.

CNS = central nervous system; GLP-1 = glucagon-like peptide-1; IRA = Inflation Reduction Act; MFN = Most-favored-nation.

Figure 4. Conceptual modality map illustrating the relative impact of IRA and potential MFN pricing policies across therapeutic areas. Note: The x-axis represents potential MFN price compression, while the y-axis represents relative Medicare/IRA exposure. Bubble size reflects reliance on small-molecule therapies. Therapeutic areas in the upper-right quadrant are expected to experience the greatest combined pricing pressure. In contrast, those in the lower-left quadrant are expected to have the lowest combined exposure.

Rare disease and orphan therapies score separately because of the orphan-drug exemption from Medicare price negotiation, whose scope changed materially in 2025 when new legislation broadened it.19

Data sources and verifiability

Sources span three tiers: peer-reviewed journals carrying a DOI or PMID; primary government and legal records; and trade, consultancy, and financing sources. Consultancy estimates, particularly international price differentials, are triangulated against peer-reviewed and government sources wherever possible and reported as best-available estimates rather than audited figures.

Results

The transmission mechanism, quantified (RQ1)

RQ1 examines whether and how pricing policy influences early-stage biopharmaceutical investment and development activity. The evidence base is anchored primarily in analyses of venture capital investment patterns, modality-specific financing shifts, and post-approval clinical development activity, supplemented by policy and industry sources documenting organizational responses (Table 3).

Table 3. Literature Mapping for RQ1: Through what mechanism does pricing policy reach preclinical investment decisions?

Source (relevance to study)Evidence addressing the questionSpecific in-text evidence
Schulthess et al. (2025). Peer-reviewed analysis of early-stage VC by molecule typeEstablishes that policy-driven revenue compression reaches early-stage capital allocation, not only marketed productsSmall-molecule early-stage VC fell ~68% after the IRA; large-molecule investment ~10× larger by 2024; dose-response with Medicare exposure (p ≤ 0.0018)
Odouard et al. (2025). R&D investment baseline for startup-developed biologicsProvides the pre-policy financing baseline against which the post-IRA shift is measured~75% of VC historically flowed to small molecules, concentrated in early-phase trials — the segment now most exposed
Patterson et al. (2024). Multi-indication small-molecule developmentIdentifies the post-approval research channel through which the nine-year clock suppresses development30 of the 50 highest-spend Part D drugs were multi-indication small molecules; second indications accrue over years of post-approval research
Zheng et al. (2025). Grabowski et al. (2024): Post-approval oncology trial activityConfirm the mechanism propagates downstream into clinical development decisions.Difference-in-differences shows post-approval oncology trials declined more for small molecules than biologics after the IRA.
DCF transmission argument (this paper; CRS, 2023; Inflation Reduction Act 2022)Formalizes how peak-net-revenue compression propagates backward to preclinical NPVA ~30% cut to projected peak net revenue more than halves preclinical-asset value once stage-gated probabilities and discounting compound

Note. RQ1 evidence is predominantly Tier 1–Tier 2 (peer-reviewed and government), the strongest tier in the synthesis.

DCF = discounted cash flow; NPV = net present value; VC = venture capital.

The clearest evidence that pricing policy reaches early-stage investment comes from the divergence between small- and large-molecule financing (Figure 3). Small-molecule early-stage venture capital fell by approximately 68% after the 2022 law, and by 2024, aggregate large-molecule investment was roughly ten times larger.5 The effect scaled with Medicare exposure: individual small-molecule investments declined by about half as their exposure to the Medicare-aged population rose, a dose-response relationship that points to the 2022 law rather than to generic market conditions.5 Downstream, post-approval oncology trials contracted more for small molecules than for biologics, consistent with reduced incentives to pursue the subsequent indications that historically accrue through years of post-approval research.6–8

Named corporate decisions corroborate the aggregate data. Industry reporting documents that firms paused or discontinued small-molecule programs, citing the law's economics; the introduction of the Ensuring Pathways to Innovative Cures Act was specifically intended to equalize the nine- and thirteen-year timelines.20–22 The 2025 executive order itself directs the Department of Health and Human Services to work with Congress to end the pill penalty, an implicit acknowledgment that the asymmetry distorts development incentives.21

Differential exposure across modalities (RQ2)

RQ2 examines how the combined effects of Medicare negotiation and international reference pricing differ across modalities and therapeutic areas. Exposure is not uniform: the interaction of development economics, pricing architecture, reimbursement dynamics, and regulatory design creates distinct incentive structures for different technology platforms (Table 4).

Table 4. Literature Mapping for RQ2

Source (relevance to study)Evidence addressing the questionSpecific in-text evidence
Simon-Kucher (2026): Therapeutic-area structure of US-to-international price differentialsSupplies the MFN axis of the exposure map, resolved by therapeutic areaUS prices ~4.8× higher for cardiovascular, ~1.13× for orphan, ~1.2× for hematology; CGT compressed below 2×
Inflation Reduction Act (2022); CRS (2023): Statutory negotiation timelinesSupplies the IRA axis: the 9- vs. 13-year modality asymmetry that differentiates exposureSmall molecules eligible at 9 years, biologics at 13; deliberate four-year differential not revised in implementation
Zheng et al. (2025). Grabowski et al. (2024): Oncology modality splitDocument within-area bifurcation by modality (favored biologics/CAR-T vs. disadvantaged small molecules)Post-approval trial decline concentrated in small-molecule oncology; ADCs, bispecifics, and CAR-T comparatively favored
Chambers et al. (2023). Orphan follow-on indications under the IRAExplains the low-exposure orphan position and the single-indication exemption trapSingle-orphan-indication exemption offers partial protection; pursuing a second indication can forfeit it
FiercePharma (2026a, 2026b): Gene-therapy and GLP-1 pricing casesProvide modality-specific signal cases at the extremes of the exposure mapRegeneron offered a gene therapy at no cost; GLP-1 became the focal high-exposure class with reported reductions
Exposure-scoring framework (this paper)Integrates the IRA and MFN axes into a single modality- and area-resolved mapSix therapeutic areas scored on differential, Medicare exposure, modality, and orphan eligibility.

Note. RQ2 combines Tier 1–Tier 2 IRA evidence with Tier 3 (consultancy) MFN differentials; consultancy figures are triangulated and reported as the best available estimates.

ADC = antibody–drug conjugate; CGT = cell and gene therapy; GLP-1 = glucagon-like peptide-1.

Small molecules: highest policy exposure. Small molecules exhibit the highest combined exposure. The nine-year negotiation timeline directly compresses the value of lifecycle management and indication expansion, helping explain the sharp retreat of venture capital from the modality.5 Because cost of goods is typically a small fraction of price, revenue compression flows almost directly to margin, and the multi-indication platform strategy is structurally disincentivized when the negotiation clock begins at first approval.7 Small molecules nonetheless retain irreplaceable clinical advantages, including oral administration and the ability to cross the blood-brain barrier, which is why their disadvantage has drawn bipartisan legislative concern.23

Biologics: protected but not immune. Biologics occupy an intermediate position. The thirteen-year window has redirected investment toward the modality,5 though that protection is partial. In immunology and related areas, rebate dynamics already compress net prices while international reference pricing adds further pressure where United States-to-international differentials are large.4

Gene therapies: relatively insulated. Gene therapies appear comparatively insulated because of smaller international price differentials, an estimated 1.2 to 1.5 times, well below many chronic therapeutic categories, a one-time treatment model, and limited dependence on rebate structures.4 The insulation is not complete: manufacturing costs for adeno-associated virus products can represent a substantial share of selling price, and the interaction among one-time therapies, Medicaid best-price rules, and outcomes-based contracting remains unresolved, as illustrated by at least one manufacturer's decision to provide a gene therapy at no cost.24

CAR-T and cell therapies: reimbursement-driven exposure. CAR-T and other cell therapies are relatively insulated from international reference pricing but remain exposed through reimbursement architecture, particularly Medicaid best-price provisions and outcomes-based contracting. The dominant policy concern for the modality is therefore the design of payment models capable of accommodating large upfront expenditures rather than international reference pricing itself.

Therapeutic-area exposure map (RQ2 synthesis)

The modality-level findings provide the foundation for understanding variation across therapeutic areas. Integrating the two policy dimensions with modality characteristics produces the therapeutic-area exposure map (Table 2 and Figure 4).

Cardiovascular and metabolic diseases, including glucagon-like peptide-1 (GLP-1) receptor agonists, face the highest combined exposure: the United States-to-international price differential is the largest of any major therapeutic area, about 4.8 times, and the concentration of Medicare-aged patients amplifies Medicare-negotiation exposure.4 Immunology and autoimmune disease also face substantial exposure, where existing rebate-wall dynamics already compress net prices and international reference pricing adds further pressure in categories where United States prices exceed international benchmarks by roughly 3.5 to 4 times; the biologic window partially offsets this, and observed responses include movement toward orphan-adjacent indications.4

Next areas for compression include hematology/oncology and central nervous system and neurodegenerative disorders. Hematology/Oncology is moderate-to-high but heterogeneous: biologic and cell-therapy assets are comparatively favored, while small-molecule kinase and Kirsten rat sarcoma virus oncogene homolog (KRAS) inhibitors remain disadvantaged by the nine-year timeline.6,8 Central nervous system and neurodegenerative disorders are particularly sensitive where international reference pricing intersects Medicare concentration, with conditions such as Alzheimer's and Parkinson's disease at elevated risk and younger-onset disorders comparatively insulated.

Facing lower exposure are rare and orphan disease, and cell and gene therapy categories. Rare disease and orphan indications face low-to-moderate exposure, since international differentials are among the smallest observed and the orphan exemption provides partial protection, though pursuing additional indications can forfeit that protection.4,25 Cell and gene therapy remains the least exposed category because of its limited international differential, one-time pricing structure, and separation from rebate-driven reimbursement.4

Early launch evidence is consistent with this map, although the observational design cannot isolate the newer policy's effects from contemporaneous regulatory and market changes.26

Across eleven European Union member states whose prices help anchor the United States reference benchmark, non-orphan launches, the products for which a lower European price feeds most directly into a lower United States price, fell 46.1% in the twelve months around the May 2025 executive order, while orphan launches, whose value rests disproportionately on rest-of-world revenue, fell only 9.9%.26 The United States pattern was the mirror image: non-orphan launches were flat even as the same products' launches fell across the reference markets, the signature of a reference-pricing spillover in which manufacturers preserve the United States launch while withdrawing from markets that set the United States price floor. The therapeutic classes that reference-pricing pilot programs designate for this treatment are the same high-differential, Medicare-exposed areas the exposure map ranks highest, concentrating the launch evidence in precisely the categories the map predicts will be squeezed.

One qualification sharpens this reading. Among orphan products, launch resilience held only outside the European Union's Joint Clinical Assessment: orphan launches outside that assessment were essentially flat, while orphan oncology and orphan advanced therapy products subject to mandatory assessment since January 2025 declined 22.9%.26 The protection this analysis assigns to orphan and cell-and-gene assets is therefore partly contingent on an access pathway that a scheduled 2028 expansion of that assessment will progressively narrow.

Strategic adaptations observed (RQ3)

RQ3 examines how firms, investors, and entrepreneurs are responding strategically to the incentives these policies create. Because many responses are emerging and forward-looking, the evidence base combines peer-reviewed studies with industry reports, policy analyses, and market observations (Table 5).

Table 5. Literature Mapping for RQ3

Source (relevance to study)Evidence addressing the questionSpecific in-text evidence
Schulthess et al. (2025). Odouard et al. (2025): Modality shift in financingDocuments capital shifting toward biologics to capture the longer negotiation window.Large-molecule investment ~10× small-molecule by 2024; biologics the preferred destination for redirected capital
Chambers et al. (2023). Orphan anchoring behaviorIdentifies orphan-indication anchoring to preserve the single-indication exemptionDevelopers maintain costly backup programs to avoid forfeiting the exemption when expanding indications.
ITIF (2025); Chemical & Engineering News (2024); No Patient Left Behind (2024): Program-level responsesDocument named program pauses and the legislative response (EPIC Act)Industry reports describe firms pausing or discontinuing small-molecule programs because of IRA-related economics. Separately, bipartisan legislators introduced the EPIC Act to equalize timelines.
Epstein Becker Green (2025). Policy-direction signalShows the policy apparatus itself acknowledging the distortionThe 2025 MFN order directs HHS to work with Congress to end the pill penalty
CSIS (2026); Pharmaceutical Technology (2025): Exit and structure responsesDocument Medicare-agnostic targeting, CGT preference, AI-enabled discovery, and M&A-over-IPO exitsCapital favors younger-onset populations and CGT; exits tilt to acquisition in a concentrated market.

Note. RQ3 relies most heavily on Tier 3 industry and policy sources and is correspondingly the most provisional of the three questions; claims are triangulated across multiple sources where possible.

CGT = cell and gene therapy; EPIC = Ensuring Pathways to Innovative Cures; IPO = initial public offering; M&A = mergers and acquisitions

Four adaptations recur across the evidence. Capital is shifting toward biologics to capture the longer negotiation window and preserve more future revenue.5,26 Developers increasingly anchor programs on orphan indications to preserve the single-indication exemption and reduce pricing exposure.24 Ventures are targeting younger-onset and Medicare-agnostic populations to reduce direct exposure to Medicare-linked pricing. Investors and developers increasingly favor cell-and-gene modalities paired with AI-enabled discovery that lowers capital requirements per approved therapy and exit strategies have tilted toward acquisition rather than public offering as financing markets remain concentrated and risk-sensitive.9,16,23

Discussion

Interpretation

This study posed three questions. For RQ1, the DCF model identifies the mechanism: commercial-stage price compression lowers expected revenue and therefore reduces early-stage asset valuations, an effect concentrated at the most fragile, heavily discounted preclinical stage. The roughly 68% post-2022 decline in small-molecule early-stage venture capital, scaling with Medicare exposure, is the empirical signature of that channel. For RQ2, the exposure-scoring framework resolves the two policy axes into a single map, placing cardiovascular/metabolic, immunology, and Medicare-aged central nervous system assets at the highest combined exposure and orphan and cell-and-gene assets at the lowest. For RQ3, the evidence documents a shift toward biologics, orphan anchoring, younger-onset populations, and cell-and-gene modalities, with exits tilting toward acquisition in a concentrated market. The three answers converge on a single interpretation.

The results describe a reshaped investable frontier. Capital now favors assets with four characteristics: a small United States-to-international price differential, a patient population that is not predominantly Medicare-aged, a biologic or cell-and-gene modality, and a level of unmet need that supports orphan or breakthrough pricing power. Assets lacking these features, most starkly small-molecule drugs for large, Medicare-aged, high-differential indications such as cardiovascular disease, face a structurally lower risk-adjusted return than they did before 2022. The modality map is therefore not a forecast of industry decline but a description of where capital is migrating within it.

This migration carries a public-health tension that the financial logic alone obscures. The modalities and indications now favored are not necessarily those of greatest clinical need: small molecules remain uniquely able to be taken orally and cross the blood-brain barrier, making them indispensable for the very Medicare-aged conditions, cardiovascular disease and neurodegeneration, from which capital is retreating. The orphan-anchoring exemption is valuable but partly a tax-and-exemption artifact rather than a purely unmet-need response, and the tilt toward biologics and cell-and-gene therapy concentrates investment in high-cost modalities with their own access challenges. A reallocation rational at the level of each investment decision can therefore produce an aggregate innovation portfolio less well matched to population health than the one it replaced.

Recent policy developments suggest the CMS GENErating cost Reductions fOr United States Medicaid (GENEROUS) Medicaid model may matter beyond international reference pricing alone.27 Its broader innovation lies in establishing a centralized federal negotiation infrastructure that lets participating state Medicaid programs negotiate standardized rebate agreements and coverage policies collectively, potentially reducing administrative burden and strengthening bargaining power beyond what individual states could negotiate alone.27

The startup-specific paradox

The repricing falls hardest on the smallest firms, a dynamic one analysis calls the MFN paradox.9 A large, diversified manufacturer can absorb price compression across a broad portfolio; a single-asset preclinical startup cannot, since its entire enterprise value rests on one DCF, and a 30% to 50% reduction in projected peak net revenue can render the venture uninvestable.9 Because early-stage startups are the primary source of novel small-molecule innovation, a policy that disproportionately lowers small-molecule valuations falls disproportionately on the firms least able to withstand it.

Policy implications

Three levers would most directly limit this distortion. The first is equalizing the small-molecule and biologic negotiation timelines, the explicit aim of the Ensuring Pathways to Innovative Cures (EPIC) Act and a stated objective of the 2025 executive order.21,23 The second is reforming the orphan exemption so that pursuing a second indication does not forfeit protection, removing the incentive to leave clinically valuable indications undeveloped.25 The third is calibrating the newer order with carve-outs or transition mechanisms for rare disease and cell and gene therapy, where the international differential is already small and aggressive compression would yield little savings while chilling investment in high-unmet-need modalities. Each lever targets a distortion the exposure map identifies, rather than the policies' overall cost-control goals, and future reform may benefit from targeted approaches that balance affordability with innovation incentives rather than treating the two as mutually exclusive.

A price-ceiling lens: from surplus transfer to a leftward shift in innovation supply

The repricing this paper describes can be read through the standard microeconomics of price controls, which clarifies what is and is not novel about the policy environment (Figure 5). A binding price ceiling ordinarily moves buyers and sellers along fixed curves and, in a competitive market, produces a shortage.28 The Maximum Fair Price and the newer reference-pricing benchmark are administered ceilings of this kind, but two refinements determine how they operate on the assets this paper studies.

Figure 5. Two Supply Curves: Why an Administered Price Ceiling Transfers Surplus in the Product Market but Shifts the Innovation Supply Curve Leftward Note. Panel A shows that, because the short-run supply of an approved drug is nearly vertical (price greatly exceeds marginal manufacturing cost), a binding ceiling Pc below the equilibrium price P* lowers producer surplus with little change in quantity: a transfer rather than a shortage. Panel B shows the long-run innovation market, where lower expected prices reduce the net present value of projects and shift the innovation supply curve from S0 to S1, thereby reducing the number of new therapies developed.

First, the relevant products are patent-protected and sold by firms with market power, not in competitive markets. For a monopolist, a ceiling set below the unconstrained monopoly price but above marginal cost does not create a shortage and can raise output toward the competitive level; a shortage appears only if the ceiling is pushed below the competitive price.29 In the short run, these caps function largely as a transfer of surplus from manufacturers to payers and patients. Because they discipline a monopoly price, they can improve static welfare. This dynamic reflects the legitimate core of the policy case, and the analysis here does not dispute it.

The second refinement is where this paper's contribution lies. The distinction that matters is not whether a ceiling causes a short-run shortage but whether it shifts the long-run supply curve of innovation leftward as producers facing lower expected returns withdraw investment.28 The DCF transmission documented earlier is precisely the mechanism by which an administered ceiling on commercial-stage price reaches back to the supply of new assets, and the roughly 68% post-2022 decline in small-molecule early-stage venture capital is the empirical signature of a supply curve that is already shifting rather than a market sliding along a fixed one.5 The price-ceiling lens thus recasts the central finding in price-theoretic terms: these policies are not simply transfers but interventions whose lasting effect operates on the long-run supply of innovation.

What the modality map adds to the textbook account is that this leftward shift is not uniform: the exposure analysis shows the contraction concentrated in small-molecule, Medicare-aged, high-differential segments and largely absent in protected modalities. The startup paradox is the distributional corollary, since the single-asset venture cannot diversify across a portfolio. The newer order introduces a further wrinkle the closed-economy model omits, because pegging the United States ceiling to foreign prices gives manufacturers an incentive to raise prices in, or withdraw launches from, low-price reference markets, a cross-border distortion no longer only theoretical. In the year after the executive order, new-product launches fell 29.9% across the reference basket and 37.8% in the European states that also prepare for Joint Clinical Assessment.26 In the United States, launches fell just 10.5% and non-orphan launches did not fall at all.26 Read together, these qualifications reframe the three policy levers above not as opposition to cost control but as instruments for shaping where, and how steeply, the innovation supply curve is allowed to shift.

Contributions

This study makes three contributions that the preceding analysis substantiates. The first is theoretical and integrative: combining the peer-reviewed investment-impact literature5–8 with the valuation literature4,9 into one frame shows that the two policies are not parallel discounts but orthogonal axes whose interaction determines an asset's true exposure. An asset can sit on the protected side of one axis, and the exposed side of the other, and only the combined view reveals its net position.

The second contribution is methodological. The paper formalizes the DCF transmission argument that the financing data only imply, making explicit why a policy aimed at marketed products reaches preclinical valuation and why the effect concentrates at the earliest, most fragile stages of investment. The literature-mapping tables (Table 3-5) extend this contribution by tying each research question to its evidentiary basis and making transparent the gradient of certainty from the peer-reviewed mechanism evidence behind RQ1 to the more provisional industry evidence behind RQ3.

The third contribution is practical. The modality map converts two separately studied policies into a single, readable picture of differential risk. For investors, it identifies where risk-adjusted returns have structurally shifted and which characteristics now define the investable frontier. For policymakers, it localizes the distortions reform could target, distinguishing the small-molecule penalty, the orphan-exemption trap, and uncalibrated reference-pricing compression from the policies' legitimate cost-control aims.

Limitations and future work

Three limitations bound these findings. First, causal attribution remains complicated by the concurrent post-2021 biotechnology financing correction; although the divergence between small- and large-molecule investment is consistent with policy-specific effects, the analysis cannot fully isolate all confounding factors. Second, venture capital estimates vary across data providers because tracking services use different taxonomies for development stage, geography, financing type, and modality, so aggregate figures should be read as directional rather than precise. Third, the newer pricing regime remains in an evolving state of implementation, and its ultimate impact depends on voluntary manufacturer participation, CMS payment-model design, and legal durability, all subject to change; the CMS GENEROUS model, for example, is a voluntary demonstration rather than a permanent policy.27 The magnitude of the effects reported here should therefore be read as conditional on the policy environment taking the form current proposals anticipate, describing the economic incentives these policies create rather than definitive evidence of their long-term effects.

Conclusion

Pharmaceutical pricing policy no longer acts as a uniform discount on commercial-stage drugs. Conversely, it acts as a modality- and indication-specific repricing that transmits backward into the earliest investment decisions. The IRA's nine-versus-thirteen-year asymmetry and MFN's area-specific price differentials together favor biologics over small molecules, younger-onset populations over Medicare-aged ones, and cell-and-gene and orphan modalities over large, high-differential indications. Taken together with the gross-to-net deflation reshaping list prices, these forces represent the most significant repricing of pharmaceutical research-and-development risk-adjusted returns since the Hatch-Waxman framework of 1984. The central practical implication is stark: the pre-2022 DCF assumptions are structurally invalid for Medicare-exposed, small-molecule, large-indication assets, and the investment community has already begun to act on that fact. Whether the resulting reallocation serves patients depends on whether policymakers address the specific distortions (e.g., the small-molecule penalty, the orphan-exemption trap, and uncalibrated MFN compression) that the modality map makes visible.

Declarations

Acknowledgments
The authors gratefully acknowledge Joseph Chang, Stephanie Cheng, and Christie Trinh for their contributions to manuscript review and editorial guidance.

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Article information

Authors

  • John M. YorkErnest Mario School of Pharmacy, Rutgers University; Cranfield School of Management; Anne Burnett Marion School of Medicine, Texas Christian UniversityCorresponding author · [email protected]
  • Bhumika S. DevnaniErnest Mario School of Pharmacy, Rutgers University
  • Gehna ShahErnest Mario School of Pharmacy, Rutgers University
  • Rayan K. SalihErnest Mario School of Pharmacy, Rutgers University

How to cite

York, J. M., Devnani, B. S., et al., 2026. Pricing Policy and the Modality Map: How U.S. Drug Pricing Reform Reprices Therapeutic Areas and Technology Platforms. Medical Research Archives, [online] 14(10). https://doi.org/10.18103/mra.2026.0616

Record

Journal
Medical Research Archives
Section
Policy Articles
Published
31 October 2026
ISSN
2375-1924
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Copyright and licence

Published by the European Society of Medicine under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence (CC BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original authors and source are credited.